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The Recognition of Kosovo – A Political Affair 
In 2008, about 50 states decided to recognize Kosovo as a legal independent state. 
These recognitions were led by the United States and were often debated. Many 
countries considered the Kosovar unilateral act of independence as illegal and have not 
recognized Kosovo yet. Examples of countries that have not recognized Kosovo are the 
Russian Federation, China and India. Intriguingly, Spain also decided to not recognize 
Kosovo. This research helps to understand why some countries decide to recognize 
Kosovo, while similar countries do not. Moreover, this research provides important 
insights in order to accelerate the research in the relatively new field of study on the 
recognition of states. The decision making procedures of Spain and the United Kingdom 
are compared in order to understand what factors explain their varying outcomes on 
the recognition of Kosovo. This thesis examines the influence of refined existing as well 
as previously neglected factors, such as close ally relationships, path dependency, 
secessionist movements and electoral costs on the recognition behavior of states.  
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1. Introduction 
 
On the 17
th
 of February 2008, Kosovo declared its independence. Several states 
responded by recognizing Kosovo as a legal independent state. This recognition, 
together with the recognitions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, has substantially changed 
the relatively consistent practice of state recognition. Political considerations have 
become more important in the decisions of states to recognize new states (Ryngaert & 
Sobrie, 2011, p. 471). However, there are intriguing elements in the case of recognition 
of Kosovo. The United Kingdom (UK) was among the countries that immediately 
recognized Kosovo on the 18
th
 of February 2008. Therewith, the British government 
was among the first countries in the European Union (EU) to support the independence 
of Kosovo. Despite their internal problems with possible secessionist movements, the 
British government urged other countries to also recognize Kosovo (Tatham, 2015).   
 Surprisingly, other prominent member states of the EU came to a different 
conclusion by refusing to recognize Kosovo. In 2008, the then Foreign Minister of 
Spain, Miguel Ángel Moratinos stated that Spain could not recognize Kosovo because 
that would ‘not respect international law’ (The Independent, 2008). It is important to 
take into account that, just like the UK, Spain had to deal with internal secessionist 
movements. In Catalonia and the Basque Country, some groups were interested in a 
possible secession. These groups might have influenced the foreign policy decision of 
Spain to not recognize Kosovo.        
 It is puzzling to see that seemingly similar countries like the UK and Spain came 
to such different decisions. Since Spain has not recognized Kosovo yet, the relevance of 
examining this topic is high. Moreover, there is a shortage of consistency and coherence 
in EU foreign policy regarding the recognition of new states. The causes for these 
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coordination problems can be explained by researching this topic.   
 The present studies on the recognition of states have only concentrated on the 
role of international law and under which conditions states become recognized by the 
international community. Only Beverly Crawford (1995) and Bridget Coggins (2011) 
try to explain why states recognize other states. They do this by combining international 
and domestic factors that can account for the behavior of recognition-providing states. 
Therefore, this paper builds on these theories. However, in light of the specifics of the 
cases of interest, these studies cannot provide an overarching and complete answer to 
the question of why states recognize other states. Particularly the cases of the UK and 
Spain’s recognition of Kosovo are intriguing and this leads to the following research 
question: why did similar countries like the United Kingdom and Spain come to a 
different decision regarding the recognition of Kosovo in 2008?    
 This paper combines both more nuanced existing and previously neglected 
international and domestic variables. Factors such as close allies, path dependency, 
internal secessionist challenges and governmental electoral costs are derived from 
Crawford’s domestic approach and Coggins’ international approach in order to provide 
a more nuanced and complete answer to the question of why states recognize other 
states. The next section gives an overview of existing theories on the recognition of 
states. Subsequently, the theories on which the research is based are explained and the 
hypotheses are presented. In the third section, the variables are specified and the exact 
research methods are discussed. Then, the empirics are presented, followed by a 
conclusion. 
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2. Literature review 
 
Recognition of new states: constitutive vs. declaratory  
The study of the recognition of states is a relatively new field. Nevertheless, recognition 
by itself is not difficult to define. Two different conceptualizations have traditionally 
been used within the existing scholarship: the constitutive school of thought and the 
declaratory school of thought. The first group argues that states can be seen as a state 
when they are recognized by other states, while the second group claims that states 
become states when they meet legal criteria for statehood according to international law 
(Ryngaert & Sobrie, 2011, p. 469; Talmon, 2005, p. 101). Because scholars of the 
declaratory school focus on legal reasons, they do not take political factors into account 
for the understanding of the recognition of states (Downer, 2013, pp. 583-586; Krasner, 
1999, p. 71). Therefore, for these scholars, the foreign policy decision-making process 
of recognition-providing states is of no importance whatsoever.   
 Authors of the constitutive school argue that an exclusively juridical explanation 
does not explain the reality on the ground (Fabry, 2013, p. 165; Türk, 1993, p. 68). 
There are several examples, such as Slovenia and Somaliland, for which the 
international community have not consistently applied the criteria of international law 
regarding the recognition of new states (Eggers, 2007, p. 222; Rich, 1993, p. 39; Türk, 
1993, p. 69). This provides additional support for Fabry’s claim (2013, p. 166) that 
political reasons and decision-making processes are of substantial importance for 
understanding states’ decisions to recognize new states. Based on these arguments, this 
paper follows the logic of the constitutive school of thought.  
Which new states does the international community recognize?  
Although there is a substantial amount of literature available in the domain of the 
recognition of states, the main focus lies on the perspective of recognition-seeking 
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states. Ethnic homogeneity and mobilization, a democratic governmental body, friends 
in high places, institutional empowerment, relative strength and negotiated consent are 
variables that increase the chances of being recognized (Coggins, 2011, pp. 435-440; 
Franck, 1992, p. 90; Roeder, 2007). Although these studies might determine why certain 
states have a higher chance of being recognized than others, there is no specific 
explanation for the behavior of recognition-providing states. For example, Kosovo 
meets the legal criteria for recognition according to the International Court of Justice 
and is generally seen as a democratic country, but it is still only partially recognized by 
the international community. Therefore, to understand the recognition of new states, it is 
important to look at the decision-making processes within recognition-providing states 
while keeping the characteristics of the recognition-seeking state constant.  
Why and when do states recognize new states?  
Some authors do try to explain the question of why states recognize other states and 
sometimes decide this unilaterally. Crawford (1995) introduces the idea of domestic 
factors as an important element in explaining why states decide to unilaterally recognize 
new states. She suggests three conditions under which domestic politics matter in 
foreign policy issues. States act unilaterally regarding the recognition of new states 
when (1) the decision has to be ratified at home, (2) when the issue at stake is 
surrounded by substantial uncertainty and (3) when there is no clear national security 
threat from the newly recognized country or its former parent-state (Crawford, 1995, p. 
27). Even though she mentions the possible national security threat from the 
recognition-seeking countries as a factor, she does not take into account the possible 
national security threat from inside. For instance, recognition-providing states could 
create a precedent that could subsequently be used by internal secessionist movements. 
Therefore, Crawford overlooks some important domestic factors that could influence 
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the foreign policy decision of recognition.       
 More recently, Fabry (2010) has provided a normative argument. He mentions 
that recognition is the result of national and international factors, because states cannot 
become sovereign countries only in terms of their constitution (Fabry, 2010, p. 11). He 
comes to the conclusion that new states should become de facto states before third 
parties should recognize their independence and third parties should not intervene in 
this process (Fabry, 2010, p. 89). On the one hand, this answer gives us a normative 
explanation for which path of recognition is the most successful and it includes the 
potential role that the international community could play in determining the final status 
of states. On the other hand, it does not provide a clear and satisfying answer about 
which internal factors help explain the decision of states to recognize other states.     
 By making a distinction between domestic authority and system membership, 
Coggins (2011, p. 440) is the first author that introduces a combination of international 
and national factors to explain why states decide to recognize new states. External 
security, domestic insecurity and international coordination are the determining factors 
(Coggins, 2011, pp. 449-453; 2014, pp. 45-48). States will recognize a new state when 
that decision does not threaten their own security position, when they do not have to 
deal with internal secessionist challenges and when there is coordination among great 
powers (Coggins, 2011, p. 461). Unfortunately, Coggins mainly approaches states as 
part of the international arena and does not sufficiently open the black box of the state 
by looking at the possible influence of domestic factors. Her study is mainly a 
quantitative study that identifies some degree of correlation between the above-
mentioned variables. Although she combines her large-n study with case studies, she 
does not fully explain the mechanisms that take place within the recognition-providing 
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state, such as how and when internal secessionist movements influence their 
government’s decision to recognize a new state. Coggins (2011, p. 463) recognizes this 
problem when she states that ‘future research into state emergence should concentrate 
on the dynamics of recognition among states using in-depth case studies’.  
Overall assessment  
International law is not a sufficient explanation for whether states are recognized or not. 
The declaratory school is not backed up by empirical evidence. Political and domestic 
factors also seem to matter. Although there are several explanations for which potential 
new states are more likely to become recognized by the international community, there 
is not much knowledge on the question of why states recognize other states. Coggins 
seems to come up with the most accurate explanation by claiming that geostrategic 
considerations, domestic insecurity and international coordination are the determining 
factors for why states recognize other states. However, this explanation seems to be 
insufficient when we look at the recognition of Kosovo. The UK and Spain did not have 
to fear external threats from, for instance, Serbia. Neither was there a lack of 
international coordination, and both countries had to deal with internal secessionist 
movements. Thus, the existing theory needs to be complemented with more nuanced 
and complete explanations for the recognition behavior of states. A comparative case 
study of the contrasting decisions of Spain and the UK on the recognition of Kosovo is 
necessary to achieve this goal. The next section of this paper describes the theories that 
are used in this research and presents the hypotheses.    
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3. Theoretical framework 
 
Main theories 
The focus of this research lies on the domestic-level approach of Crawford (1995) and 
the international-level approach of Coggins (2011; 2014). These theories provide useful 
and novel variables that can explain why some states recognize new states and others do 
not. However, Coggins’ and Crawford’s hypotheses are not sufficiently nuanced and 
extended to explain the varying decisions by the UK and Spain on the recognition of 
Kosovo. Therefore, this project aims to refine the influential factors presented by 
Coggins and Crawford. Moreover, the approaches are combined with previously 
neglected variables derived from other approaches. A quantitative case study provides 
the opportunity to examine whether the refined hypotheses, which are presented in the 
following paragraph, can be confirmed in the cases of Spain and the UK regarding the 
recognition of Kosovo. Then, this project opens the door to further research on this 
topic.           
 This deductive research project focuses on four broad logics presented by 
Coggins and Crawford. Crawford (1995, p. 8) argues that there are three social forces 
that could influence party elites regarding the decision to recognize new states, namely 
public opinion, interest groups and media. Although these factors fail to explain in her 
article why Germany recognized Croatia, we can still derive useful hypotheses from this 
perspective. In this research, public opinion, interest groups and media are used to 
determine the influence of potential electoral costs for the Spanish and British 
governments related to the recognition of Kosovo. In order to also include and control 
for both international and domestic factors, Coggins’ (2011, pp. 449-453; 2014, pp. 45-
48) variables of international coordination, external security and domestic insecurity are 
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important to examine the question of recognition or non-recognition. Since Coggins’ 
variables are presented in a rather general fashion, I have refined the variables and 
complemented them with other neglected factors. The four hypotheses are not mutually 
exclusive.           
 Lastly, since only one recognition-seeking state is examined, it is not necessary 
to include hypotheses based on domestic variables that account for the state 
composition of Kosovo. The next paragraph presents the four hypotheses that are tested.  
3.1 Hypotheses 
International level 
 
Geostrategic  
In her international level model, Coggins (2014, pp. 45-46) includes geostrategic 
considerations as an important independent variable to account for why states decide to 
recognize new states. She mentions that states consider their own power position by 
looking at the existing international security environment to find out what effect the 
recognition of a new state would have on the status quo. In her analysis and hypothesis 
formulation, Coggins only focuses on the relation between the parent-state of the 
secessionists and the recognition-providing state by claiming that states are less likely to 
recognize a new state when they are in a friendly relationship with the parent-state of 
the secessionists (Coggins, 2014, p. 46). However, this logic can be specified by 
applying it to the relations among recognition-providing states. For instance, in the case 
of civil wars, Findley and Teo (2006, pp. 834-835) claim that states are more likely to 
intervene when one of their close allies has already started an intervention in the 
conflict. So, by looking at a combination of the strength of relationships between allies 
and their recognition behavior, we can derive the following hypothesis:  
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H1: Recognition-providing states are more likely to recognize new states when their 
close ally, with whom they have a special relationship, also recognizes the new state. 
 
Path dependency  
Although Coggins (2014) focuses on the relation between recognition-providing states 
and the parent-state of secessionist movements, she does not look at the relationship 
between recognition-providing states and recognition-seeking secessionists. In practical 
terms, Coggins would not consider the relationship that Spain and the UK have with 
Kosovo, because she neglects possible commitments that states have made to external 
secessionist movements. However, her underlying logic that recognition-providing 
states take into consideration their relationship with the parent-state of secessionist 
movements still holds when we apply it to the relationship between recognition-
providing states and recognition-seeking secessionists.    
 For instance, several findings from the civil war literature relate close ties 
between the interveners and intervened through colonial history, ideological 
relationships and historical ties to a higher possibility of intervention and support (Greig 
& Regan, 2008, p. 776; Findley & Teo, 2006, pp. 834-836; Regan, 1998, p. 767). In 
light of former interventions by NATO and the UN, in which the UK was a more 
prominent player than Spain, we can link the theoretical insights to the theory of path 
dependency. Kay (2003, p. 411) claims that sequencing matters because former events 
can move a policy into a certain direction and subsequently reinforce future policy 
decisions that move in the same direction. Therefore, the next hypothesis is based on the 
findings in the field of path dependency, civil war interventions and the before 
mentioned logic of Coggins:  
H2: Recognition-providing states are more likely to recognize new states when they 
were directly committed to the creation of this new state. 
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Domestic level 
 
Internal political actors  
Coggins (2014, p. 46-47) says that internal secessionist challenges are potentially 
influential in the matter of recognizing new states that might increase the domestic 
security concerns of a state. Governments have to consider the possibility that they can 
create a precedent for internal secessionist movements when they decide to recognize a 
new state (Coggins, 2014, p. 47). Secessionist movements might then see an 
opportunity to use a decision in their advantage by calling for their own secession. 
However, Coggins (2014, p.47) operationalizes this influence in a rather general fashion 
by stating that countries with secessionist challenges are less likely to recognize 
secessionists in other states. This cannot sufficiently explain the variance between the 
UK and Spain. Thus, a more sophisticated and specific hypothesis is necessary. I argue 
that states have to take internal secessionist challenges into account and I also look at 
whether they would create a precedent with recognizing secessionists in other states or 
not. This leads to the following hypothesis:  
H3: The more governments are challenged by internal secessionists, the less likely they 
are to recognize new states out of fear of creating a precedent.
1
 
 
Electoral costs 
One last underexplored factor is the influence of governmental electoral costs on the 
foreign policy decision of recognition of a new state. Liberal institutionalist theories 
introduce domestic constraints and the influence of governmental electoral interests into 
the field of foreign policy analysis (Pohl, 2013, pp. 308; 321). Moravcsik (1993, p. 481) 
argues that governments respond to the preferences of domestic actors before they make 
a decision at the international level. Governments are interested in generating as many 
                                                          
1
 I have also looked at the potential influence of ethnic identity groups and the lobby of Kosovars and 
Albanians in Spain and the UK. However, there is no evidence available to assume that this ethnic group 
played any substantial role in the recognition processes whatsoever.  
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votes as possible to get reelected and, therefore, try to gain support of domestic 
constituencies that have the capacity to influence public opinion (Dai, 2005, p. 365; 
Moravscik, 1993, p. 483). In order to secure its reelection, governments also want to 
avoid making decisions that could cost them electoral support. Domestic constituencies 
are defined as ‘individuals and private groups […] who organize exchange and 
collective action’ (Moravcsik, 1997, p. 516). Hence, actors as voters, public opinion, 
opposition parties and politicians are potentially influential factors to equally consider.
 Liberal institutionalism allows introducing the insights of Crawford (1995) into 
this hypothesis. She only reluctantly introduces the societal factors of public opinion, 
interest groups and media into the field of recognition by focusing on several interest 
groups, opinion polls and surveys that were published during the period that Germany 
decided to recognize Croatia. Although Crawford has not found a clear relationship 
between the influences of these societal factors and the recognition of Croatia by 
Germany, there are other scholars who claim that these domestic factors are important. 
For example, Risse-Kappen (1991, p. 510) states that mass public opinion matters in 
foreign-policy decision-making through indirect effects. Namely, he argues that public 
opinion limits the available foreign policy options and mass public opinion is 
particularly influential when the issue is salient to the incumbent political elites. 
Through relating electoral costs to the influences of media, interest groups and public 
opinion, this research provides a more specific and sophisticated explanation than 
Crawford. The insights are captured in the following hypothesis:  
H4: When governments fear electoral costs as a result of recognizing a new state, they 
are less likely to recognize this new state. 
In the next section, the presented hypotheses and variables are explained and 
operationalized in order to clarify how these possible causal relationships are measured.  
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4. Operationalization  
 
Case identification 
The case selection of this project is based on the Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD). 
Hence, it is important to select cases that are similar across most background conditions, 
but show variance regarding the dependent variable (Seawright & Gerring, 2008, p. 
304). The cases selected for this research are the UK and Spain. These countries are not 
only both democratic and unitary parliamentary constitutional monarchies, but they are 
also members of the same international organizations. Examples of such organizations 
are NATO and the EU. Above all, the two cases score similarly on Coggins’ 
independent variables that are meant to explain foreign policy decisions on recognition:  
Coggins’ IVs 
 
 
Cases 
X1- Context 
international 
coordination 
among great 
powers 
X2- 
Internal 
secessionist 
challenges 
X3- 
External threat by 
parent-state 
secessionist  
Y- 
Recognition or 
non-recognition 
United Kingdom Similar  Yes, Scotland No clear threat from 
Serbia 
Recognition of 
Kosovo 
Spain Similar Yes, Catalonia and 
the Basque County 
No clear threat from 
Serbia 
Non-recognition 
of Kosovo 
Table 1: scores of Spain and the UK on Coggins’ Independent and Dependent Variables 
Despite these similarities, the cases differ on the dependent variable. The UK has 
recognized Kosovo, while Spain has not. Therefore, a comparison of these cases is very 
useful to identify the specific reasons for why states recognize a new state or not.  
Case-selection and research method 
The MSSD allows performing a controlled comparison. In the cases of the UK and 
Spain, existing theories cannot sufficiently explain the varying decisions on the 
recognition of Kosovo. Therefore, it is necessary to examine more nuanced as well as 
previously overlooked independent variables. A controlled comparison is the ideal 
method for cases that are ‘comparable in all respects except for the independent 
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variables, whose variance may account for the cases having different outcomes on the 
dependent variable’ (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 81). This argumentation makes a 
controlled comparison the best option to examine which variables explain why the UK 
decided to recognize Kosovo and Spain decided not to recognize Kosovo. Moreover, 
the fact that a controlled comparison looks at comparable sources from similar time 
periods increases the strength and consistency of the argumentation. This simplifies any 
possible replication of the case studies, makes the research more transparent and opens 
the door to further research on the topic and findings of this project. Hence, in this 
research it is necessary to evaluate the different hypotheses to the two cases under the 
same conditions.          
 However, this method also has some flaws. A first disadvantage of a controlled 
comparison is that it is hard to find cases that are completely similar (George & 
Bennett, 2005, pp. 151-153). Nonetheless, the case selection in this thesis shows that 
Spain and the UK score similarly on important independent variables and, most 
importantly, score different on the dependent variable that is under examination in this 
research. A second disadvantage of a controlled comparison based on a MSSD, is that it 
is hard to make generalizations. Nevertheless, this research can give concrete insights in 
the foreign policy decision-making behavior of European democracies with 
parliamentary systems that have to deal with internal secessionist challenges. 
Furthermore, because the recognition of new states is a rather new field of study, this 
research could provide insights for further general research on important variables in the 
foreign policy decision-making process regarding recognition or non-recognition. 
Finally, by analyzing national differences, this examination helps to understand why the 
EU is not able to generate a coherent foreign policy on the recognition of new states. 
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Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is the decision to recognize a state or not. The UK can be placed 
in the first category, while Spain belongs to the second. The evidence is based on 
statements of the Spanish and British ministers of Foreign Affairs. On the 18
th
 of 
February 2008, British Foreign Secretary Miliband stated that ‘the British government 
has decided to recognize Kosovo’ (Reuters, 2008a). While, on the same day, Spanish 
Foreign Minister Moratinos said that ‘the government of Spain will not recognize the 
unilateral act proclaimed yesterday by the assembly of Kosovo’ (Reuters, 2008b).   
Independent variables  
Allies with a special relationship, path dependency, internal secessionist challenges and 
electoral costs are the four independent variables that are derived from the hypotheses 
that are presented in the theoretical framework. These variables can be identified at the 
international and domestic levels of analysis. In the following section, the 
operationalization of the variables is explained. 
International level independent variables 
First, the independent variable derived from H1, allies with a special relationship, refers 
to situations ‘in which a foreign state is seen like another self [and] provide a more 
adequate account of how one is doing in one’s attempt to secure minimally just 
institutions and policies’ (Digeser, 2009, pp. 339-340). According to Coggins (2014, p. 
48), the role of great powers is vital, because countries are more likely to recognize new 
states when great powers have already done so. In this research, the focus lies on the 
relationship of the UK and Spain with the United States (US). First, the US was one of 
the major great powers in 2008 and, second, the US was of decisive importance in the 
Kosovar case, because the recognition of Kosovo was initiated by a US-led coalition 
(Fabry, 2012, p. 661). Regarding the decision on the recognition of Kosovo, the close 
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ally relationship was either present or absent. The expectation is that a recognition-
providing state will act in accordance with their close ally. Nevertheless, this relation 
only holds under the condition that the role and influence of the close ally, in this case 
the US, was also mentioned in parliamentary debates, governmental statements, 
speeches, interviews, party manifestos, newspapers, academic publications or policy 
reports. In order to find evidence for H1, I look at the convergence between the 
argumentations and decisions of Spain and the UK with those of the US with regards to 
the recognition of Kosovo. Then, I examine whether the Spanish and British 
governments explicitly referred to the US in their argumentations to support their 
decision. At last, I focus on whether there is evidence from the US that they put 
pressure on Spain or the UK to recognize Kosovo. H1 is confirmed when both allies 
made the same decision regarding the recognition of Kosovo and the close ally 
relationship was explicitly mentioned. The focus of this variable lies on the time period 
between December 2007 and February 2008, because this is the period during which the 
independence of Kosovo was discussed from the Council of Minister meeting of the EU 
on the 14
th
 of December until the actual decision on the recognition of Kosovo on the 
18
th
 of February 2008.       
 Secondly, in the context of H2, path dependency is a situation in which ‘initial 
events that move policy in one direction will encourage future developments in that 
same direction and the effects of early policy decisions will often reinforce those 
decisions’ (Kay, 2003, p. 411). This is a categorical variable and path dependency was 
either present or not. When members of government and politicians explicitly referred 
to former commitments linked to the creation of Kosovo in parliamentary debates, 
governmental statements, speeches, interviews and party manifestos, path dependency 
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was present. When decision-makers and politicians did not explicitly mention former 
commitments to the creation of Kosovo in order to support their decision on the 
recognition of Kosovo, path dependency was absent. Potential commitments can be 
found in UNSC resolutions, military interventions, bilateral aid programs and whether 
there were diplomatic ties with Kosovo. Since the process towards the determination of 
the final status of Kosovo started with the UNSC Resolution 1244 in 1999, the time 
period of the data selection for H2 starts in June 1999 and ends in February 2008.       
Domestic level independent variables 
Coggins (2011, p. 47) describes internal secessionist challenges (H3) as a domestic 
constituency that expresses ethnic discontent by trying to find a legitimate way to create 
its own state. Coggins (2011, p. 47) also mentions that the more acute the challenge is, 
the less likely it is that states recognize a new state. However, the UK and Spain both 
seemed to be facing an acute secessionist challenge in 2008. In order to provide an 
opportunity to create a more sophisticated and nuanced explanation for the influence of 
secessionist challenges than Coggins, this variable is operationalized in an ordinal way. 
A secessionist challenge was high when secessionist movements made public 
statements in which they linked their plans for secessionism explicitly to the Kosovar 
case. Evidence of these statements is found by looking at political statements, speeches, 
interviews and political manifestos of internal secessionist movements and in 
newspapers, academic articles and policy reports. We can speak of a medium-level 
challenge when internal secessionists movements mentioned Kosovo in political 
statements, interviews and other sources during the decision-making process on the 
recognition of Kosovo, but did not link this explicitly to their own plans for secession. 
When internal secessionist movements did not pay any attention to Kosovo, the 
challenge by internal secessionist movements was low. In order to make a convincing 
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argument I first examine whether the secessionist movements in the UK and Spain were 
already advocating for their independence prior the Kosovar independence. Then, I look 
at how the secessionist movements responded to the Kosovar case. Lastly, I focus on 
whether the British and Spanish governments perceived the internal secessionist 
challenges as a potential threat. For the same reasons as with H1, the focus of H3 lies on 
the time period between December 2007 and February 2008.     
 Lastly, electoral costs (H4) are defined as the interest of governments in 
generating as many votes as possible to be reelected and, therefore, trying to avoid 
losing support of domestic constituencies that have the capacity to influence elections 
(Moravcsik, 1993, p. 483). Voters, public opinion, opposition parties and individual 
politicians are potential factors that could create electoral costs for governments 
regarding a foreign policy topic, in particular in period of elections. When public 
opinion polls, opposition parties, local parties and influential politicians were explicitly 
in favor of non-recognition of Kosovo, then the electoral costs for the government to 
recognize were present. This evidence can be found in political statements made by 
opposition parties and influential politicians, governmental statements that responded to 
requests made by domestic constituents, interviews and speeches of national and local 
politicians and public opinion polls in which more than 30% of the population was in 
favor of non-recognition. When domestic constituents were on the same line with 
regards to the recognition of Kosovo or when only a small part of the population (< 
30%) supported non-recognition of Kosovo, governmental electoral costs for 
recognition were absent. The 30% threshold is based on the fact that about 20 to 30 
percent of the public see foreign policy as salient (Risse-Kappen, 1991, p. 481). These 
people could change their voting behavior as a consequence of the foreign policy of a 
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party. Therefore, when less than 30% of the total population supported non-recognition, 
it is likely that only a non-influential percentage of the electorate would have changed 
their voting behavior. A higher threshold cannot be justified, since relatively small parts 
of the population can create substantial effects on the Spanish elections outcome. 
 To find evidence for H4, I also look at media coverage, because this is a strong 
indicator for whether the issue was salient. As with the H1 and H3, the focus lies on the 
period between December 2007 and February 2008.     
Data  
The evidence for this research is based on both primary and secondary sources. A 
combination of both primary and secondary sources is necessary to discover latent and 
manifest reasons for the recognition of Kosovo by the UK and the non-recognition of 
Kosovo by Spain. On the one hand, primary sources such as speeches, press releases, 
political manifestoes, governmental documents, opinion polls and public statements are 
used to discover the underlying argumentation of both decision-makers and influential 
actors in the decision-making process regarding the recognition of Kosovo in the UK 
and Spain. These sources are useful in a controlled comparison, because most of the 
evidence for the hypotheses can be found in clear statements and explicit references to 
certain factors such as close allies, secessionist challenges and former commitments. By 
looking at comparable data in both countries, it is possible to make a comparison 
between the UK and Spain on the relative influence of independent variables that are 
examined in this research.         
 In particular, statements made by ministries of both countries, political parties 
and politicians are used as evidence. The most relevant political parties for this research 
are the Labour Party (Labour), the Conservative Party (Conservatives), the Liberal 
Democrats (LibDems), the Scottish National Party (SNP), Partido Socialista Obrero 
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Español (PSOE), Partido Popular (PP), Convergència i Unio (CiU), Esquerra 
Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) and Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV). Furthermore, 
statements of Prime Ministers Gordon Brown and José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, 
Foreign Ministers David Miliband and Miguel Ángel Moratinos and influential 
secessionist and opposition politicians like Alex Salmond, Artur Mas, Mariano Rajoy, 
David Cameron and Juan José Ibarretxe are used to support the claims made in this 
research. Lastly, I build on declassified documents from the archives of the UK, Spain, 
Catalonia and Scotland.        
 On the other hand, secondary sources, such as local and national newspapers of 
different political ideologies, academic articles, history books and policy reports are 
consulted. Secondary sources make it possible to trace certain underlying arguments 
that are not always mentioned by, for instance, members of government. By looking at 
the presence and intensity of the independent variables in public debates through 
secondary sources, it is possible to get a clearer and more comprehensive overview of 
the importance of these variables in the decision-making processes regarding the 
recognition of Kosovo. Examples of local and national newspapers and of different 
political affiliations that I use to find evidence are The Daily Telegraph, The Guardian, 
The Scotchman, The Herald, El País, El Periodico, La Vanguardia, La Razón and El 
Mundo. Moreover, I build from the findings of several scholars that have written on this 
issue. The subsequent section of this thesis presents the evidence I have found in the 
consulted sources.   
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5. Empirical section 
 
5.1 Close allies 
As the major great power of the last twenty years, the position of the US with regards to 
the independence of Kosovo was of vital importance. The recognition of Kosovo by a 
part of the international community was the consequence of a well-prepared and 
deliberate lobbying effort led by the US (Fabry, 2012, p. 661). In order to examine 
whether the relationship between the UK, Spain and the US was decisive in their 
decisions on the recognition of Kosovo or not, it is important to know how the position 
of the US towards Kosovo evolved.        
 The US was strongly committed to the determination of the final status of 
Kosovo. On the 21
st
 of May 2009, the Vice President of the US, Joseph Biden, declared 
to the Assembly of Kosovo that the ‘success of an independent Kosovo is’ a US 
‘priority’ (White House, 2009). Above that, the US actively and continuously urged 
other countries to recognize Kosovo and to promote their integration in the international 
community (Woehrel, 2011, p. 342).        
 The supportive position of the US was already present before the Kosovar 
declaration of independence on the 18
th
 of February 2008. The US Ambassador to the 
United Nations (UN), Zalmay Khalilzad, said, during a meeting of the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) on the 18
th
 of February 2008, that the recognition of Kosovo 
was the direct result of ‘a long unique process’ which started after the violence during 
the Yugoslavian wars in the 1990s. UNSC Resolution 1244, which was adopted in 
1999, was the first step towards the determination of Kosovo’s final status and since 
then, the US had supported Kosovo’s path towards independence (Security Council 
Report [SCR], 2008, p. 18). In March 2007, UN Special Envoy, Martti Ahtisaari stated 
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that the independence of Kosovo was the only viable solution for peace and security in 
the region (SCR, 2016). This conclusion was seen as the official permission for Kosovo 
to declare its independence and was immediately supported by the US (SCR, 2007; 
SCR, 2008, p. 18).            
 The US officially recognized Kosovo one day after the Kosovar declaration of 
independence (US Department of State, 2008a). The US Ambassador to the UN said 
that the recognition of Kosovo was the ‘logical, legitimate and legal response to the 
situation at hand’ and ‘fully consistent with’ former resolutions (SCR, 2008, p. 18). 
Hence, the US was a perseverant and committed advocate for the recognition of Kosovo 
as independent state and also tried to convince their allies to join the coalition in favor 
of the recognition of Kosovo.        
 In the next part, the focus lies on demonstrating whether there was a link 
between the UK and Spain positions on Kosovo and the position of the US.  
5.1.1 United Kingdom 
Since the Second World War, the UK and the US have had a special relationship based 
on shared values, language and history (Dumbrell, 2009, p. 65). They often worked 
together on foreign policy issues and they professionalized their alliance with 
commitments through international organizations, such as NATO. Moreover, they held 
formalized expectations of co-operation and collaboration (Dumbrell, 2004; Dumbrell, 
2009, p. 65). In 2008, there were no signs that the strong and close alliance between the 
UK and the US had changed (Dumbrell, 2009, p. 71). Though, Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown used a different rhetoric with regards to the special relationship with the US, 
because he wanted to be less dependent on the US than his predecessor Tony Blair 
(Dumbrell, 2009, p. 71). Nevertheless, the close alliance might have played an 
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important role on the similar decisions of the UK and the US regarding the recognition 
of Kosovo.           
 First, it is interesting to emphasize that the US and the UK used similar 
argumentations regarding the path to and the actual recognition of Kosovo (United 
Nations, 2008). Just like his American colleague, the UK Ambassador to the UN, Sir 
John Sawers, referred to the long and unique process towards the determination of the 
status of Kosovo as an independent state, that started with the UNSC resolution 1244 
(SCR, 2008, pp. 12-13). Furthermore, in line with his American colleague, Sir John 
Sawers supported the conclusion of UN Special Envoy, Martti Ahtisaari, that the 
independence of Kosovo was the best solution to create peace and security in the region 
and was ‘the only viable way forward’ (SCR, 2008, p. 13). For the British government, 
the chronology of events led to the decision to recognize the independent state of 
Kosovo. The British and the Americans used similar argumentations, but the question is 
whether this means that the British decision to recognize Kosovo was the direct result of 
their special relationship with the US or not.       
 In fact, a reference to the decision of the US regarding the recognition of Kosovo 
was not included in the British argumentation. The British mainly focused on the 
chronology of events, democratic values and human rights with regards to their decision 
to recognize Kosovo (Chatham House, 2008; UK Parliament, 2008a; SCR, 2008, p. 13). 
In his written ministerial statement on the 19
th
 of February, Secretary of State of Foreign 
Affairs Miliband did not mention the US at all (UK Parliament, 2008a). Actually, the 
independence of Kosovo was framed as a ‘European issue’. The press office of the UK 
government stated that the Kosovar issue ‘must be resolved […] with the EU in the 
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lead’ (Foreign & Commonwealth Office [FCO], 2007)2. Miliband also said that the EU 
had ‘to play a leading role in bringing the status process through to conclusion’ (Der 
Spiegel, 2008; UK Parliament, 2008a). Moreover, the UK declared their recognition of 
the independent state of Kosovo on the 18
th
 of February. The US made that decision on 
the same day, but EU countries were the first to announce their policy on Kosovo (Der 
Spiegel, 2008). This evidence shows that the EU countries, led by the UK, were trying 
to take a united stance regardless of the policy of the US.     
 From the American side, there were some references made to the relationship 
with the UK regarding the recognition of Kosovo. Assistant Secretary for European and 
Eurasian Affairs, Daniel Fried, for instance stated in an interview with the Washington 
Journal that ‘The United States has a responsibility in the world. In Kosovo, we are 
working not alone, not unilaterally, but with our European allies, especially with the 
United Kingdom’ (US Department of State, 2008b). It might be the case that the 
Americans needed countries such as the UK to justify their own decision to recognize 
Kosovo. However, ten days after the recognition of Kosovo, a report was released by 
the American Congressional Research Service on the state of the partnership between 
the US and the UK. This report presented several examples of foreign policy decisions 
in which the UK followed the US. Regarding Kosovo, the report only referred to the 
military support that was given by the UK during the NATO air campaign in 1999 
(Archik, 2008). There was no reference made to the decision of recognizing the 
independent state of Kosovo. There was no direct evidence that the US pushed the UK 
in a certain direction.                   
 Based on the evidence, the US and the UK coordinated their behavior regarding 
                                                          
2
 7
th
 of December 2007. Letter from the press office of the UK government. (‘Kosovo final status – 
Media.’). The citation can be found in the appendix, document no. 1  
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the recognition of Kosovo. First of all, both countries recognized Kosovo on the same 
day. Secondly, the fact that the US and the UK used exactly the same argumentation to 
justify the recognition of Kosovo is particularly interesting. Thirdly, both the US and 
the UK often referred to the coordination between the Western allies and particularly 
the coordination between each other with regards to the recognition of Kosovo.  
 Nevertheless, the claim can be made that the close ally relationship factor 
between the UK and the US was absent with regards to the recognition of Kosovo. 
Firstly, British officials did not explicitly mention that the British decision to recognize 
Kosovo was based on the decision of the US. This might be related to the fact that 
Prime Minister Brown tried to be less focused on the US than his predecessor Tony 
Blair. Secondly, the British government framed the issue as a European one and 
supported the position that the EU should play a leading role in determining the status 
of Kosovo. Lastly, the US never made any statements that implied that they put pressure 
on the UK regarding the recognition of Kosovo.  
5.1.2 Spain 
The relationship of Spain with the US can be characterized as strong. American 
politicians see Spain as ‘an important US ally and one of the closest US partners in 
Europe’ reinforced by ‘extensive cultural ties and a mutually beneficial economic 
relationship’ (Mix, 2015). The intensity of the close ally relationship between the two 
countries partially depends on the political ideology of the government in power. The 
ties are generally stronger when the government is led by the conservative PP instead of 
by the socialist PSOE (Mix, 2015, p. 7). An example of this difference is the foreign 
policy change that happened under the socialist Zapatero led government after the pro-
Atlantic government of the conservative PP lost the elections in 2004. The Zapatero 
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government changed its focus from the Atlantic to the European continent and aimed 
for more cooperation with the EU rather than with the US (Vaquer i Fanés, 2011, p. 15). 
After the elections, Zapatero immediately and abruptly withdrew all Spanish troops 
from Iraq and this seemed to end the special relationship that had carefully been 
constructed by the Aznar government (Basora, 2009, p. 94; Mix, 2015, p. 7). 
Notwithstanding this policy change, the bilateral relationship continued during the years 
prior to the declaration of independence of Kosovo (Basora, 2009, p. 94). Therefore, the 
Spanish-American relationship still might have played an important role with regards to 
the decision on the recognition of Kosovo.       
 Until the debates on the final status of Kosovo started, the Spanish and 
American positions regarding the fate of Kosovo seemed to be broadly similar. Since 
1999, Spain had supported UNSC resolutions and NATO statements in favor of 
international intervention in Kosovo. However, the main argumentation for the Spanish 
support was based on the promotion of European and Atlantic unity and the 
reinforcement of democratic values and human rights in the Balkan Peninsula 
(Johansson-Nogués, 2008, p. 2). The conviction that the final status of Kosovo should 
had been determined by the international community in order to promote peace and 
security in the region was not included in the public Spanish argumentation. The 
argumentations of the US and Spain started to diverge publicly after the publication of 
the Ahtisaari Plan, which saw the independence of Kosovo as the only viable solution, 
and the failure of the subsequent negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia (Johansson-
Nogués, 2008, p. 2). The main disagreement focused on the legality of the Kosovar 
independence. According to the Spanish government, the independence of Kosovo was 
a unilateral act that was not in line with international law and UNSC Resolution 1244 
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(Senado, 2009, p. 145). By contrast, the Americans were convinced of the legality of the 
independence of Kosovo which was justified by UNSC Resolution 1244 (SCR, 2008, p. 
18). Hence, unlike the British, Spain had a completely different interpretation of what 
happened prior to the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo than the 
Americans.          
 The Spanish opposition against the US-led coalition in favor of recognition was 
intensified by the position of the European-centered Zapatero government. In December 
2007, after the meeting of the European Council, the Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero 
stated that peace and security should be restored in the Western Balkans and that the EU 
should have a ‘common and unique position’ regarding the final status of Kosovo (El 
País, 2007a; Johansson-Nogués, 2008, p. 3). Moreover, the Spanish Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Moratinos declared that he ‘supported European unity’ on this issue (El País, 
2007b). There were no references made by the Spanish government to promote unity 
with the US. Furthermore, the pro-Atlantic PP was against the recognition of Kosovo 
(Vaquer i Fanés, 2011, p. 13). The leader of the PP, Mariano Rajoy, stated in an 
interview on the 17
th
 of February 2008 that he strongly opposed the unilateral 
declaration of independence of Kosovo and that he expected the incumbent government 
to not recognize the sovereignty of Kosovo (El País, 2008a). Gerardo Galeote, a 
Member of the European Parliament of the PP added that the declaration of 
independence of Kosovo was ‘very bad news for Spain’ and should be rejected (El 
Mundo, 2008). Thus, the most pro-Atlantic parliamentarians were against the 
recognition of Kosovo as well and did not take the relationship with the US into 
consideration.            
 In fact, Spain made statements that publicly countered the arguments made by 
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the US and its close allies regarding the Kosovar recognition (Fabry, 2012, p. 666). For 
instance, Spain voted in favor of requesting the International Court of Justice to provide 
an advisory opinion on the legality of the independence of Kosovo, while the US voted 
against such a decision (United Nations General Assembly, 2008). Eventually, Spain 
led the anti-recognition coalition of member states within the European Union (The 
Guardian, 2008a). The US Ambassador to Spain had concerns ‘regarding third countries 
reporting that Spanish diplomats have lobbied against Kosovo recognition, sometimes 
opposing other EU diplomats who were seeking to promote recognitions’ (US Embassy 
to Spain, 2008a). Although they denied the accusations, Spain actively lobbied against 
the US-led coalition that was trying to convince other states to recognize Kosovo 
(MacShane, 2008).            
 An additional possible explanation for the Spanish disagreement with the US 
might have been its room to maneuver on this topic, because the recognition of Kosovo 
was not a hot topic in such a way that it could rise tensions between the US and Spain 
(Mix, 2015, p. 7). After Spain decided to not recognize Kosovo and to withdraw its 
troops from Kosovo, the US Vice President, Joe Biden stated that ‘the relationship we 
have with Spain exceeds whatever disagreement we may have over Kosovo’ (Reuters, 
2009). However, the US unsuccessfully asked Spain for clarification of their position 
and they pressured Spain not to act counterproductive in the process (US Embassy to 
Spain, 2008a).         
 Eventually, the disagreement led to diverging decisions with regards to the 
recognition of Kosovo. There are several justifications to claim that the close ally 
relationship between Spain and the US was absent in the decision-making process 
towards the non-recognition of Kosovo. Firstly, the actual decisions on the status of 
 
 31 
Kosovo were completely opposite. Spain decided to not recognize Kosovo and led the 
anti-recognition coalition of European countries, while the US recognized Kosovo and 
led the international coalition of Kosovo recognizing states. Secondly, the relations 
between Spain and the US were rather cold during the Zapatero government, but even 
the most pro-Atlantic parliamentarians of the PP were against the recognition of 
Kosovo. Thirdly, despite some diplomatic pressure, Spain opposed the statements of the 
US regarding both the recognition of Kosovo and the advisory opinion of the ICJ in 
2010. Lastly, the alternative explanation that Spain tried to focus on European allies due 
to the shift in focus of the Zapatero government from the US to the EU is not 
convincing. After it became clear that there was no single voice in the EU regarding the 
status of Kosovo, Spain decided to act on its own and decided to not recognize Kosovo.
 Concluding, since H1 cannot convincingly explain the variance in the British 
and Spanish decisions on the recognition of Kosovo, it is necessary to look at other 
possible explanations. In the next section, the influence of path dependency is 
examined. 
5.2 Path dependency 
The US Vice President Joseph Biden stated to the Assembly of Kosovo on the 21
st
 of 
May 2009 that the path to the Kosovar independence ‘included nearly a decade of U.N. 
administration and determined diplomacy by the US and our partners in Europe that 
resulted in the plan that you are following to this day’ (White House, 2009). This 
decade of diplomacy started with the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1244 in 1999 and 
was followed by a NATO intervention, the deployment of international peacekeeping 
forces and several financial aid programs. During such an intense diplomatic process, it 
is possible that some states took binding commitments that led to a certain policy 
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direction. In the next section, the focus lies on the possible commitments that were 
made by the UK and Spain that might have led them to the recognition of Kosovo. 
5.2.1 United Kingdom 
The UK had maintained extensive ties with Kosovo, since the end of the Yugoslav wars 
in the 1990s (Doyle & Morina, 2013, p. 6). The relationship between the UK and 
Kosovo is a classic example of how historical context matters in international relations 
(Selimi, 2011). During the Distinguished Speaker Series of the The Hague Institute for 
Global Justice on the 15
th
 of March 2016, President Elect of the Republic of Kosovo 
Hashim Thaçi, stated that the relationship between Kosovo and the UK is historically 
strong and special (Thaçi, 2016). The history of interactions between the UK and the 
Kosovar movement might have led to certain commitments that eventually explain why 
the UK recognized Kosovo.        
 The British commitment towards Kosovo’s status started during the preparations 
for the NATO intervention in 1999 when Tony Blair played a ‘crucial role’ in passing 
UNSC resolution 1244 that ‘saved Kosovo’ (Selimi, 2011). Because of these efforts, 
current President Elect of Kosovo, Hashim Thaçi, called Tony Blair ‘a political giant 
given the tremendous role that Blair played in helping my country forge its 
independence’ (Office of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Kosovo, 2016). UNSC 
resolution 1244 cleared the way for an international civil and military presence in 
Kosovo in order to ‘establish an interim administration for Kosovo under which the 
people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy’ (UN, 1999). Contrary to comparable 
resolutions, it did not explicitly prohibit a possible declaration of independence. 
Therefore, UNSC resolution 1244 is often seen as an important step towards the 
independence of Kosovo (Hilpold, 2012, p. 323).      
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 The British did not only play a crucial role in the adoption of UNSC resolution 
1244, they also participated in the following military intervention. The NATO-led 
Kosovo Force (KFOR), which came into play after the adoption of UNSC resolution 
1244, underlined the British commitment to actively participate in securing a peaceful 
and safe future for Kosovo (Doyle & Morina, 2008, p. 9). By sending 10500 troops to 
the mission, the British were responsible for the support of almost 20% of the whole 
mission which comprised a total of 50.000 troops (House of Commons, 1999). 
Eventually, the total cost for the military operation in Kosovo was estimated to be more 
than 1 billion pounds (The Guardian, 2014).        
 Besides the military support and the commitment to establishing a final 
settlement for Kosovo, the UK focused on state building and development aid. The 
British government provided indirect support for the improvement of the government 
capacity of Kosovo through the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK). According to Doyle and Morina (2008, p. 9), the British participation in 
UNMIK was comparable to other EU countries, but this participation also made it 
possible for the UK to develop its bilateral help to Kosovo that was vital for a future 
independence of Kosovo.         
 The bilateral help from the UK was more extensive than the bilateral help of 
other EU member countries for Kosovo. In the beginning of this century, from 2000-
2002, the British government spent over 17 million pounds on bilateral assistance to 
Kosovo in order to establish a governmental framework (Doyle & Morina, 2013, p. 8). 
After that first period, the British government remained committed to the state building 
process of Kosovo (Doyle & Morina: 2013, p. 8). By providing bilateral aid, the British 
tried to fulfil several goals, such as stabilizing Kosovo through developing stable and 
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accountable central government institutions, supporting the European integration of 
Kosovo and promoting the international cooperation within the state (Doyle & Morina, 
2013, p. 8). This commitment to strengthening the capacity and efficiency of the 
governmental structure of Kosovo had a substantial effect on the internal position of 
Kosovo. It is likely that Kosovo could not have convincingly declared its independence 
without the British political, financial and juridical support (Doyle & Morina, 2013, pp. 
11-13). The UK also built diplomatic relations with Kosovo before its independence 
(Doyle & Morina, 2013, p. 8). Moreover, in 2004/2005, British officials formulated in 
an internal document that it ‘should make clear that the logical destination of Kosovo is 
independence’ (FCO, 2004/2005)3.        
 When Kosovo declared its independence on the 17
th
 of February 2008, UK 
officials explicitly referred to former decisions that the British government took with 
regards to the creation of the Kosovar state. For instance, the UK Ambassador to the 
UN referred to the chronology of events and UNSC resolution 1244 as being important 
steps towards determining the independent status of Kosovo (SCR, 2008, pp. 12-13). In 
addition, the British Ambassador to the Republic of Kosovo and the current leader of 
the UK mission to the UN emphasized the long-lasting and continuing British support 
for the independence of Kosovo (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Kosovo, 2011; Tatham, 2015).        
 In sum, the British government committed itself to the creation of the new state 
of Kosovo through playing a crucial role in the adoption of UNSC resolution 1244. 
After this resolution, the UK continuously supported the state building, capacity 
building and governmental improvement of Kosovo through bilateral aid programs. 
                                                          
3
 2004/2005. Internal document from the Foreign & Commonwealth Office. (‘Kosovo: Elements of UK 
strategy 2004/2005.’). The citation can be found in the appendix, document no. 2 
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These programs played an important role in creating the opportunity for Kosovo to 
declare its independence. With every step they took, officials mentioned the relevant 
decisions the British government had taken beforehand. Initial events moved UK policy 
in one direction and encouraged and reinforced future developments in that same 
direction. Hence, path dependency was present as a factor in the decision of the UK to 
recognize Kosovo.  
5.2.2 Spain 
The Spanish government never played a crucial role in the Balkans (Vaquer i Fánes, 
2011, p. 9). In the 1990s, Spain was more committed to improving its integration within 
the Euro-Atlantic family than to solving the problems in Yugoslavia (Vaquer i Fánes, 
2011, p. 9). Because of the focus on its own position, Spain had not a clear policy 
regarding the Balkans and Kosovo. Therefore, after the conflict between Serbia and 
Kosovo broke out in 1998, Spain followed the general EU policy regarding the Balkans 
(Vaquer i Fánes, 2011, p. 10). Furthermore, the relation between Spain and Kosovo was 
weaker than the one between the UK and Kosovo. For instance, unlike the UK, Spain 
never established diplomatic relations with Pristina (Vaquer i Fánes, 2011, p. 10). 
Consequently, in contrast with the UK, Spain had not directly committed itself to the 
creation of the new state of Kosovo.       
 In 1999, when the UNSC resolution 1244 was adopted, Spain did not have a seat 
in the Security Council and therefore did not vote on the resolution. Nevertheless, the 
Spanish government made some official statements with regards to the resolution. On 
the 16
th
 of June 1999, the Spanish Prime Minister, José Maria Aznar stated that the 
resolution provided a solution for the political crisis in Kosovo and that Spain supported 
the resolution in order to defend democratic values and human rights (Congreso de los 
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Diputados, Leg. VI, Num. 246: 13058). Subsequently, the Spanish Secretary of State of 
Foreign Policy and the European Union, Miguel y Egea, declared that the Spanish 
support for the missions did not mean that Spain was in favor of the independence of 
Kosovo (Asociación Española de Profesores de Derecho Internacional y Relaciones 
Internacionales, 2003, p. 187). Through this statement, the Spanish government 
demonstrated its willingness to not commit itself to the possible creation of Kosovo. 
The Spanish reluctance was reiterated during the process towards the Ahtisaari plan. 
When UN Special Envoy Ahtisaari was working on his proposal on the final status of 
Kosovo, the Spanish government clarified that it was against an imposed independence 
for Kosovo by the UNSC out of fear of creating a precedent (Perritt, 2010, p. 136).  
 Despite its opposition against the independence of Kosovo, Spain decided to 
participate in the UNMIK and KFOR missions. In 1999, the Spanish government 
declared to send 1.200 troops for the KFOR mission, which accounted for 2.5% of the 
total mission, and to provide about 40 million pounds for humanitarian aid and the 
reconstruction of Kosovo (Congreso de los Diputados, Leg. VI, Num. 512, p. 2). From 
1999 until 2009, 22.000 Spanish soldiers served in Kosovo and the total costs for 
humanitarian and development aid were estimated at about 750 million pounds (Spanish 
Ministry of Defence, 2016). In general, the Spanish support for Kosovo was comparable 
with the support provided by the government of the UK, but the commitments and 
argumentation differed. Unlike the UK, Spain did not set up a bilateral aid program in 
which they committed themselves to the improvement of the governmental capacity, 
European integration and the international participation of Kosovo.   
 In fact, the extensive financial and military support for Kosovo by Spain was 
mainly based on prestige and on improving its own power position (Johansson-Nogués, 
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2008, pp. 2-5; Vaquer i Fánes, 2011, p. 10). First of all, two important positions were 
occupied by Spanish officials, namely the NATO Secretary-General (Javier Solana) and 
the Personal Representative for the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (Felipe González). 
Secondly, due to a lack of cultural, historical, economic and linguistic ties, Spain had no 
interest in Kosovo and the Balkan region itself (Johansson-Nogués, 2008, pp. 1-2; 
Vaquer i Fánes, 2011, pp. 16-17). Third, the government focused more on international 
law than on the position of Kosovo when it came to their argumentation for the non-
recognition of Kosovo (Vaquer i Fánes, 2011, pp. 8-17). Last, and most important, the 
communication with Kosovar authorities took place through the international missions, 
since Spain had never established diplomatic relations with Pristina (Vaquer i Fánes, 
2011, p. 10). The Spanish lack of interest in Kosovo came to the surface when European 
unity on the recognition of Kosovo was unachieved and Spain became the group-leader 
of the non-recognizing coalition (The Guardian, 2008a; Vaquer i Fánes, 2011).  
 In sum, despite the fact that Spain had supported most of the policies of NATO 
and the EU, it was always clear about its opposition against an independent Kosovo. 
After the resolution in 1999, the Spanish government stated that it would not recognize 
Kosovo. Moreover, it differed from other countries by not establishing a diplomatic 
presence in Pristina. Although Spain contributed to the military missions in Kosovo and 
provided financial aid to Kosovo, it did not commit itself to the creation of a Kosovar 
state by making statements in favor of Kosovar state building. Spain had no interest in 
the fate of Kosovo. As European unity on the issue of recognition of Kosovo was not 
achieved, Spain could decide to not recognize Kosovo without breaking any of its 
alliance commitments. Hence, path dependency was absent in the Spanish case.  
 In general, H2 shows that the final UK and Spanish decisions on the recognition 
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of Kosovo were in line with their former statements. Nevertheless, this variable cannot 
explain on its own why the UK and Spain made their final decision. In 1999, the British 
and Spanish governments were not aware that they had to decide on the recognition of 
Kosovo in 2008. Therefore, it is necessary to look at potential other factors, such as 
secessionist challenges and electoral costs.  
5.3 Secessionist challenges 
The UK and Spain are both countries that had to deal with internal secessionist 
movements in 2008. In the UK, the Scottish demonstrated their ethnic discontent by 
advocating in favor of the creation of their own state, while the Basques and Catalans 
tried to achieve statehood in Spain. Prior to the decision on the recognition of Kosovo, 
secessionist movements in both countries had been calling for the holding of referenda 
on the future of their regions. The SNP was the main political actor in favor of Scottish 
independence. In May 2007, the SNP obtained 47 seats and became the biggest party in 
the Scottish parliament after a strong nationalistic campaign (BBC News, 2012). In the 
meantime, the Spanish government had to deal with the PNV as one of the most 
prominent political actors in favor of independence of the Basque Country and their 
leader already called for an independence referendum in 2007 (El Mundo, 2007). The 
most prominent Catalan nationalist movement of Artur Mas, CiU, was more focused on 
gaining greater political autonomy than on secession. However, after the publication of 
the new Statute of Autonomy in 2006, tensions with regards to the status of Catalonia 
rose and led to early elections (Lang, 2013, p. 1).      
 Altogether, the secessionist challenge was already present in both the UK and 
Spain before 2008. However, the decisions regarding the recognition of Kosovo 
differed. In order to explain this difference, it is necessary to look at the positions of the 
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secessionist movements prior to the 2008 decision on the recognition of Kosovo, to 
evaluate whether the secessionists referred to Kosovo in their advocacy for 
independence and whether British and Spanish government officials considered the 
secessionist movements as a threat.     
5.3.1 United Kingdom 
The decision on the recognition of Kosovo came less than a year after the elections for 
the Scottish Parliament. Following the ‘historic victory’, the SNP acted in favor of 
enforcing independence through a referendum (The Guardian, 2007). The SNP believed 
that ‘independence is the natural state for nations like our own’ and ‘with independence 
Scotland will be free to flourish and grow’ (SNP, 2007, p. 7). Moreover, the SNP 
supported ‘a written constitution for an independent Scotland to guarantee the rights and 
liberties of citizens and limit the power of government’ (SNP, 2007, p. 66). The right of 
self-determination of the people was of great importance for the SNP and a referendum 
was considered to be the best way to achieve independence. Therefore, the SNP stated 
that they trusted ‘Scots to take the decision on Scotland’s future in an independence 
referendum’ (SNP, 2007, p. 5). A few months after the elections, the leader of the SNP, 
Alex Salmond, put these statements into practice by starting a public consultation with 
the Scottish people on the position of Scotland. Salmond initiated a ‘National 
Conversation’ that had to determine the status of Scotland with a referendum as one of 
the possibilities (Scottish Government, 2016). Thus, the threat of Scottish secession was 
high in the months prior to the British decision to recognize Kosovo.  
 Nevertheless, the SNP did not pay any attention to Kosovo in their party 
manifesto in 2007. A possible explanation for this is that the SNP was cautious about 
referring to Kosovo, since the issue could have caused electoral problems based on a 
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previous costly precedent. Namely, Salmond opposed the bombardments of NATO in 
Serbia in 1999 out of fear that the actions would be ineffective (Herald Scotland, 2001; 
World Socialist Website, 1999). In fact, the bombardments effectively stopped 
Slobodan Milosevic. Hence, a big emphasis on the developments in Kosovo might have 
brought back to light the controversial statements by Salmond regarding this topic. 
 Prior to the British recognition of Kosovo in 2008, the SNP had not made any 
public statements about Kosovo being a precedent for Scottish independence. In the 
plenary parliamentary meetings, debates and meetings of the European and External 
Relations Committee surrounding the declaration of independence of Kosovo, the 
Scottish politicians only mentioned Kosovo once. A Member of the Scottish Parliament 
for the SNP, Aileen Campbell, presented a motion to the Scottish Parliament on the 18
th
 
of February 2008 in which he ‘congratulates Kosova on achieving her independence’ 
and ‘fully recognizes Kosova as a member of the international community’ (Scottish 
Parliament, 2008). The Scottish pro-independence movement avoided any comparison 
with the Kosovar unilateral declaration of independence, because of its violent character 
(Bourne, 2014, p. 111). Scotland was aware of the Spanish resistance regarding the 
recognition of Kosovo and, therefore, the SNP was afraid that a comparison with 
Kosovo could endanger the recognition of Scotland by Spain and therewith a potential 
Scottish EU membership in case of a Scottish independence (Financial Times, 2008a). 
Hence, interestingly, the SNP had no interest in comparing Scotland with Kosovo and 
there was barely any risk of creating a precedent for the British government. 
 From the perspective of the British government and opposition, there were no 
indications of concern about secessionism either. Despite the high secessionist 
challenge from the most prominent political actor in Scotland, the British government 
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did not seem to be constrained with regards to their decision on the recognition of 
Kosovo. The mainstream British parties, Labour and Conservatives, did try to force 
Salmond to apologize for his statements on the NATO bombardments in 1999 (Daily 
Record, 2008; Scottish Parliament, 2008b). Moreover, George Foulkes called the 
‘celebratory tone of Aileen Campbell’s motion […] misguided at best and political 
opportunism in the extreme’ (Scottish Parliament, 2008c). However, this was more 
likely a strategy meant to affect the electoral prospects of the SNP than to force them to 
accept that Kosovo was no precedent for Scotland.      
 Furthermore, British government officials did not mention Scotland in their 
statements on the recognition of Kosovo. Both the UK Ambassador to the UN and 
British Foreign Minister Miliband said that EU Ministers were clear in their view that 
Kosovo constituted a sui generis case which did not set any precedent (UK Parliament, 
2008a; SCR, 2008, p. 13). However, this last statement was not unique to British 
officials as it was coordinated with other European governments and was initiated by 
Spanish diplomats (Vaquer i Fánes, 2011, p. 14). Therefore, the British government did 
not perceive Kosovo as a possible precedent for Scotland.     
 In sum, the Scottish secessionist movement cleared the way for the British 
government to recognize Kosovo by not framing Kosovo as a possible precedent. 
Despite their plans for creating a Scottish state, the Scottish nationalists actually tried to 
avoid any comparisons with Kosovo. Moreover, the British government did not refer to 
the Scottish issue whatsoever. Therefore, the British government did not have to fear the 
creation of a precedent with the recognition of Kosovo and, consequently, the 
secessionist challenge was low.  
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5.3.2 Spain 
In 2008, the most persistent secessionist challenge in Spain came from the Basque 
Country. Namely, the demand for Basque independence was accompanied by violent 
actions and the non-violent PNV presented its referendum plan for independence in 
2007 (Rodríguez-Izquierdo Serrano, 2011, pp. 429-430). For several years, the PNV 
had been the biggest party in the Basque parliament and it continuously made 
statements in favor of Basque independence. After their victory in 2001, the PNV 
developed a new political strategy to achieve Basque independence in a constitutional 
and political context (Rodríguez-Izquierdo Serrano, 2011, pp. 430-434). The refusal of 
the ‘Ibarretxe Plan’, which tried to make independence possible by changing the Basque 
constitution, led to the creation of a new way to achieve independence. This strategy 
came into play in September 2007 when the PNV-leader and president of the Basque 
region Juan José Ibarretxe presented his plan to hold a referendum on the future of the 
Basque Country on the 25
th
 of October 2008 (El Mundo, 2007). Therefore, the Spanish 
government was aware of the secessionist challenge by the Basques when they had to 
decide on the Kosovo issue.        
 Another potential secessionist challenge for the Spanish government came from 
Catalonia. However, in 2008, the Catalan nationalist parties were focusing on increasing 
their autonomous status within Spain rather than on creating their own Catalan state 
(Rodríguez-Izquierdo Serrano, 2011, p. 429). The Catalan nationalists CiU agreed with 
the new Statute of Autonomy in 2006, because it ‘responds to the Catalan wish of self-
government’ and ‘is supported by 90% of the Catalan representatives’ (Parlament de 
Catalunya, 2005, p. 10). Therewith, they agreed with the increased autonomy of 
Catalonia and had no intentions of proposing secession. The radical, but small Esquerra 
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Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) was the only party that rejected the Statute of 
Autonomy, because they preferred a path towards secession (Castellá Andreu, 2008, pp. 
96-97). The CiU did not change its position until it decided to develop a secessionist 
position, due to the economic crisis in 2010 and the problems with regards to the Statute 
of Autonomy (Blas, 2013, p. 399; Bourne, 2014, p. 95). Hence, the threat of Catalan 
secession was low in the months prior to the Spanish decision to recognize Kosovo, 
because the main political actor in Catalonian politics, CiU, was not in favor of 
secession yet. Nevertheless, secession and gaining autonomy were on-going issues in 
Catalonia.         
 Kosovo was more important to the secessionists in Catalonia and the Basque 
Country than to those in Scotland. Immediately after Kosovo declared its independence, 
several secessionist politicians reacted. The Basque government, led by the PNV, linked 
the Kosovar issue to their own situation. The spokeswoman of the nationalist Basque 
government, Miren Azkarate, said that this event was ‘a lesson for resolving identity 
conflicts in a peaceful and democratic way’ and that ‘the will of citizens is important for 
solving entrenched political problems like this.’ (El Mundo, 2008; El País, 2008b). 
Therewith, the link to their referendum plan was made. She also put extra pressure on 
the Spanish government to recognize Kosovo by referring to other Western countries 
that immediately recognized Kosovo and treated the case as a normal situation (El 
Mundo, 2008).          
 Contrary to the Basque statement, the most prominent Catalan secessionists did 
not compare the Kosovar issue with their own situation. In fact, the CiU declared that, 
although they respected the democratic will of Kosovo, ‘Catalonia is not Kosovo’ 
(Diario de Sevilla, 2008). The leader of the more radical secessionists of the ERC, 
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Josep-Lluís Carod-Rovira, admitted that a comparison between Kosovo and Catalonia 
‘makes no sense’, because they had to deal with ‘completely different realities’ (Diario 
de Sevilla, 2008; El Mundo, 2008). However, it is important to note that Carod-Rovira 
was also the vice president of the Catalan Generalitat and was therefore committed to a 
moderate view. Namely, his party members Joan Ridao and Joan Puig called Kosovo ‘a 
very important precedent’ and said that Catalonia ‘will be independent if a political and 
social majority decides it’ (US Embassy to Spain, 2008b). Moreover, the Catalan parties 
supported the Kosovar declaration of independence. Both Mas and Carod-Rovira put 
pressure on the Spanish government to recognize Kosovo as soon as possible (US 
Embassy to Spain, 2008b). Mas said that the Spanish government was not acting 
‘democratically’ if it decided to not recognize Kosovo, because that would have been 
‘against the democratic will of the Kosovar people’ (Diario de Sevilla, 2008). 
Furthermore, representatives from both CiU and ERC announced that they would go to 
Kosovo to ‘study the secession process’ (US Embassy to Spain, 2008b).   
 The division between Madrid on the one hand and Barcelona and Vitoria-
Gazteiz on the other hand was felt by the Spanish government. Already in December 
2007, before the common statement of the EU ministers on Kosovo, Prime Minister 
Zapatero called the case ‘exceptional’ and said that he ‘would not recognize a unilateral 
declaration of independence’ out of fear of Spanish secessionists (Público, 2007). 
Before that, the Spanish Foreign Minister Moratinos said that ‘Kosovo has no relation 
to territorial and administrative division in Spain from either a political, diplomatic or 
legal position’ (Johansson-Nogués, 2008, pp. 2-3). Eventually, this led to the EU 
Council of Ministers making a special statement in which they stated that Kosovo was a 
‘unique case’ and could not be compared to other cases of secessionism because of the 
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principle of ‘sui generis’ (Europa Nu, 2008). This statement was vital for Spanish 
diplomats to prevent the Catalans and Basques from using the Kosovar case in their 
advantage (Vaquer i Fánes, 2011, p. 14). In a leaked document from the Embassy of the 
US to Spain, the US Ambassador wrote that Spanish diplomats had told him that the 
recognition of Kosovo by Spain was ‘not a near-term prospect due to domestic 
considerations influenced by autonomous communities politics, particularly in the 
Basque Country and Catalonia’ (US Embassy to Spain, 2008a). Herewith, the Spanish 
government did not only implicitly link the secessionist challenge of the Basque 
Country and Catalonia to their decision on the recognition of Kosovo, but also explicitly 
declared that they feared that Kosovo would create a precedent.      
 Concluding, the Basque and Catalan secessionist movements explicitly 
pressured the Spanish government to recognize Kosovo and particularly the Basques 
linked the Kosovar case to their own position. Although the Catalans were more 
reluctant to compare themselves with Kosovo, they still encouraged the people of 
Kosovo and supported their path to independence. Moreover, the Spanish government 
continuously feared a possible precedent and despite clear statements that Kosovo was 
not a precedent, the evidence supports that it was afraid of internal problems. Therefore, 
the secessionist challenge from the Basque Country and Catalonia was high in 2008 and 
the fear of creating a possible precedent could explain why Spain did not recognize 
Kosovo. 
H3 shows that Coggins’ secessionist challenge variable needs some nuance and 
sophistication to understand the mechanisms that explain the influence of secessionist 
movements on a governments’ decision on the recognition of states. The presence of a 
secessionist movement seems to be insufficient, since a secessionist movement most 
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likely should link its own situation to that of external secessionist as well. However, 
secessionist movements referring to the Kosovar issue might be a necessary condition; 
it is not a sufficient condition. Namely, it is important to look at whether the Spanish 
government had to take these interests into account. In the next section, the potential 
electoral costs of the government with regards to the recognition of Kosovo will be 
discussed.  
 
5.4 Electoral costs 
In 2008, when the decision on the recognition of Kosovo was made, the British 
government was led by Labour and Prime Minister Brown. Labour had obtained 355 of 
the 646 seats in the House of Commons during the general elections of 2005. Their 
biggest competitors were the Conservatives with 198 seats and the LibDems with 51 
seats. The next elections were more than two years away and were planned for the 6
th
 of 
May 2010. In Spain, the PSOE had won the elections in 2004 and formed the Zapatero 
government with a large minority of 164 out of 350 seats. In order to obtain a majority, 
the government was supported by the ERC and Izquierda Unida (IU) (El País, 2004). 
The biggest and only competitor of the PSOE was the PP, which held 148 of the 350 
seats in the Spanish parliament. Interestingly, the Zapatero government was dissolved in 
January 2008 and the next elections were scheduled on the 9
th
 of March 2008, just a few 
weeks after Kosovo had declared its independence.    
 Because of the variation in electoral proximity, it is important to look at whether 
recognizing Kosovo could damage the electoral position of the two governments. 
Therefore, I mainly focus on the role played by the influential opposition parties, the 
Conservatives, the LibDems and the PP, public opinion and media coverage to 
determine whether electoral costs can explain the variation in the decisions. 
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5.4.1 United Kingdom 
The coverage of the Kosovar independence issue was not extensive in the UK. Except 
for some columnists in The Guardian and The Herald, there was not much coverage in 
either Scottish or British newspapers on the recognition of Kosovo. A columnist in The 
Guardian called the recognition of Kosovo ‘the least worse solution’ (The Guardian, 
2008b), while a columnist in The Herald tried to describe a fictional and comparable 
situation with Kosovo when Berwick would decide to secede from England (The 
Herald, 2008). In general, newspapers, such as The Guardian, The Daily Telegraph, The 
Sunday Herald and The Scotsman, only published some general factual accounts about 
the independence of Kosovo and focused more on the non-recognizing countries in the 
EU and on the position of Russia rather than on the decision of the British government. 
Moreover, the Daily Telegraph mentioned the possible precedent that Kosovo could 
create for other separatists, but did not link it to the British situation (The Daily 
Telegraph, 2008). Hence, the most relevant newspapers in the UK did not see a British 
recognition of Kosovo as salient and there has not been much criticism of the decision 
of the British government in the newspapers.      
 The general consensus in favor of the recognition of Kosovo was also present in 
the British parliament. The Labour government of Tony Blair had been supporting the 
determination of the final status of Kosovo since the adoption of UNSC resolution 1244 
in 1999. The Labour government of Gordon Brown prolonged this line by recognizing 
the independence of Kosovo on the 18
th
 of February 2008. Interestingly, the position in 
favor of the independence of Kosovo was, already prior to the decision on recognition 
in 2008, supported by the main competitor of Labour in the British parliament. In 
November 2007, the leader of the Conservatives, David Cameron, said that ‘the harsh 
truth is that after the events of 1999, there was never any prospect that Kosovo could 
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remain under the sovereignty and administrative umbrella of Belgrade’ and that ‘we 
need to take the steps to pave the way for Kosovo's independence, and to ensure that the 
threats to stability are contained’ (Cameron, 2007).  Moreover, within a few days after 
the independence of Kosovo, other British parties publicly supported the recognition. 
Sarah Ludford, a Member of the European Parliament for the LibDems, stated that 
‘there really was no other option but the independence of Kosovo’ (Liberal Democrats, 
2008). Additionally, in the first debate on the recognition of Kosovo in the British 
Parliament, Jo Swinson (LibDems), said that ´I and my party very much welcome the 
Kosovan declaration of independence and the recognition of Kosovo by the 
Government’ (UK Parliament, 2008b). In the Scottish Parliament, both the 
Conservatives and Labour supported a motion of the SNP that congratulated Kosovo on 
achieving its independence (Scottish Parliament, 2008a; Scottish Parliament, 2008b). 
Therefore, support for the government’s decision to recognize Kosovo was high.  
 The only criticism of the recognition of Kosovo came from members of the 
Conservatives. In the European Parliament, Charles Tannock said that he was afraid that 
Kosovo might create a precedent and that not all countries would see it as a sui generis 
case (European Parliament, 2008). Though, his criticism more focused on potential 
problems for other countries and on the position of his party leader than on the decision 
of the British government. In the British parliament, members of the Conservatives, 
namely Daniel Kawczynski and Bill Cash, were afraid that the recognition came too 
early and blamed the government for taking the wrong decision (UK Parliament, 
2008b). However, they were immediately reminded by their fellow Conservative Keith 
Simpson that it was ‘on record that the Opposition support the Government’s position 
on the independence of Kosovo’ (UK Parliament, 2008b). Therefore, there is 
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convincing evidence to claim that there was an overall consensus in the British 
parliament on the recognition of Kosovo and that Labour had no reason to fear a 
possible overflow of voters to other parties.         
 Unfortunately, there are no polls available that asked the British people about the 
recognition of Kosovo. However, it seems that the people of the UK have always been 
rather strong supporters of Kosovo. Already in 1999, about 70% of the British 
population supported the NATO air strikes in order to liberate Kosovo from the terror of 
Slobodan Milosevic (Ipsos Mori, 1999; Universiteit Leiden, 2008, p. 21). The UK was 
one of the few countries where a majority of the people would have been in favor of 
sending ground troops to Kosovo (Ipsos Mori, 1999; Universiteit Leiden, 2008, p. 21). 
This support could only be an indicator that British support for the plight of the Kosovar 
was high in 1999. Therefore, it is not possible to link this directly to the position of the 
British population on the recognition of Kosovo in 2008.    
 In sum, electoral costs for the British government linked to the recognition of 
Kosovo were absent. Opposition parties and their leaders were generally supportive 
towards the recognition of Kosovo. The biggest competitor of Labour was also in favor 
of the recognition of Kosovo. There was not much criticism from either opposition 
parties or the media regarding the behavior of the British government. Furthermore, 
there are no indications that a substantial part of public opinion was against the 
recognition of Kosovo, although this last claim cannot be directly supported by any 
explicit empirical evidence.  
5.4.2 Spain 
In Spain, there was less consensus on the Kosovar issue than in the UK. Most 
secessionist parties from Catalonia and the Basque Country supported the independence 
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of Kosovo, while the PP was the most outspoken party against the recognition of 
Kosovo. Moreover, the Zapatero government came into conflict with two of its electoral 
promises (Johansson-Nogués, 2008, p. 1). On the one hand, the government had 
promised to focus on the EU instead of on the Atlantic alliance. On the other hand, 
Zapatero wanted to give more autonomy to the Spanish regions without giving them the 
possibility to secede. The Kosovar issue endangered these promises, since recognition 
could have created a precedent for the Spanish regions, while non-recognition could 
have created disagreement within the EU (Johansson-Nogues, 2008, p. 1).  With the 
upcoming elections, the PP tried to exploit this conflict of promises by pushing the 
Zapatero government to make a decision on the status of Kosovo.   
 For years, the PP accused Zapatero of ‘balkanizing’ Spain and ‘presiding over 
the dissolution of 500 years old Spanish Kingdom’ (El País, 2005; US Embassy to 
Spain, 2008c). Already prior to the declaration of independence of Kosovo, the PP 
made clear that it would reject the independence of Kosovo and immediately started to 
question whether the Zapatero government would be capable of dealing with this matter 
(Vaquer i Fanés, 2011, p. 13).  On the 17
th
 of February 2008, the leader of PP, said that 
he would oppose a unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo and that he 
expected the incumbent government to not recognize the sovereignty of Kosovo (El 
País, 2008a). Moreover, the spokesperson for Foreign Affairs of the PP, Gustavo de 
Aristegui, stated that accepting a unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo 
would be a ‘mistake’, because Kosovo is ‘a Serbian province’ (Europa Press, 2008). 
After the Kosovar declaration of independence, the president of the PP Mariano 
Rajoy, believed that ‘Spain should not recognize Kosovo as an independent state if 
there is no agreement between the parties and no new resolution from the UN Security 
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Council’ (US Embassy to Spain, 2008b). Moreover, he said that Spain ‘should not send 
or maintain the presence of civilian officials’ and blamed the Zapatero government of 
‘incongruity’ and bad diplomacy (US Embassy to Spain, 2008b). Hence, the PP used 
the Kosovar issue to criticize the PSOE, framed it as incapable of dealing with 
international issues and blamed it for reinforcing secessionist tensions within Spain.  
 This position of the main competitor of the PSOE led to concerns about a 
potential electoral loss during the upcoming elections. In a leaked document, the 
Spanish Director for North America and Europe, Pene Pons, said that ‘Kosovo would be 
an elections issue’, because it was ‘in the headlines and the debate in Europe is drawing 
the government’s attention away from its campaign priorities’ (US Embassy to Spain, 
2008d). The Chief of Staff of Foreign Minister Moratinos, Javier Sancho, stated that ‘it 
was politically impossible for the government of Spain to support Kosovo’s unilateral 
declaration of independence in the middle of a hotly contested campaign’ (US Embassy 
to Spain, 2008c). Therefore, the Spanish government tried to keep the issue quiet. He 
also said that Spain would not change its position ‘until after the elections’, because the 
government ‘wants it out of the headlines’ and that ‘if Zapatero wins reelection, the 
government of Spain will be willing to discuss further avenues for progress toward 
peace and stability in the Balkans’ (US Embassy to Spain, 2008c). The PSOE was not 
only concerned about the framing of the PP, but was also afraid of losing moderate 
voters to the PP (US Embassy to Spain, 2008b).     
 Namely, the Spanish people are traditionally more reluctant when it comes to 
supporting Kosovo than the British. In 1999, about 30% of the Spanish population 
supported the NATO air strikes in Kosovo, while a majority of 53% was against the 
NATO operation in Kosovo (Barbé, Herranz & Mestres, 2003, p. 5). This trend of 
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Spanish reluctance to support Kosovo was still present in 2008. According to a poll of 
Real Institudo Elcano, which was held just after the decision of the Zapatero 
government not to recognize Kosovo, at least 40% of the Spaniards was against the 
recognition of Kosovo (El Períodico, 2008).      
 Furthermore, despite the attempts of the Spanish government to avoid media 
coverage, and unlike the Scottish and British media, Spanish newspapers widely 
reported on the issue of Kosovo. Hence, the saliency of the issue was high in Spain. In 
fact, the newspapers were divided in their opinion. The Madrid-based newspapers, such 
as El País, El Mundo, ABC and La Razón, were supporting the government in their 
opposition against the recognition of Kosovo, while the Barcelona-based newspapers, 
such as La Vanguardia, El Periodico and Avui, were in favor of the recognition of 
Kosovo (Vaquer i Fánes, 2011, p. 14). For instance, Andres Ortega, a journalist of El 
País, wrote about Kosovo that ‘more than a declaration on independence it seems like a 
declaration of dependence, Kosovo does not appear to be a prepared or viable country’ 
(El País, 2008c). Both the conservative dailies ABC and La Rázon wrote that the 
independence of Kosovo would set a dangerous precedent (ABC, 2008; US Embassy to 
Spain, 2008b). By contrast, the Catalan newspaper La Vanguardia wrote that ‘the 
independence of Kosovo is not illegal’ and a ‘recognition of Kosovo can be easily 
explained’ (La Vanguardia, 2008).          
 Concluding, the stakes for the Spanish government were high with regards to 
their decision on the recognition of Kosovo. The elections were going to take place just 
a couple of weeks after the decision and the Zapatero government was facing criticism 
from their biggest competitor. The PP opposed the recognition of Kosovo and feared 
that a possible precedent would be created. This position was reinforced by the fact that 
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Basque and Catalan parties, as well as the Catalan media supported the independence of 
Kosovo. Furthermore, the Madrid-based media were advocating against the recognition 
of Kosovo. Therefore, the PSOE could potentially lose moderate voters to the PP, if the 
government decided to recognize Kosovo. This concern was supported by the fact that 
at least 40% of the Spanish voters opposed the recognition. With the electoral calendar 
in mind, the electoral costs for the Spanish government to recognize Kosovo were 
present.  
 
5.5 General findings 
This research on the decisions of the UK and Spain with regards to the recognition of 
Kosovo has provided some interesting results. The close ally relationship with the US 
was absent in the cases under examination. Both the UK and Spain had not based their 
argumentation and decision on the behavior of their great power ally. There might have 
been some coordination with the US or the EU with regards to their statements, but the 
relationship cannot explain the varying decisions on the recognition of Kosovo. 
Therefore, it was necessary to look at path dependency as a possible explanation. H2 
can be confirmed, since the UK continuously committed itself to the creation of the 
state of Kosovo and Spain explicitly avoided any commitment towards the recognition 
of Kosovo. Nevertheless, this variable is not a sufficient condition to explain why these 
countries made opposite decisions. Namely, in 1999, both Spain and the UK could not 
expect that they had to decide on the recognition of Kosovo in 2008.   
 Hence, the explanation had to be found at the domestic level of analysis. First, 
both the UK and Spain had to deal with secessionist movements that wanted to secede. 
However, in the UK, Scottish secessionists did not see Kosovo as a precedent, while in 
Spain, Catalan and Basque secessionists explicitly linked their future to the decision of 
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the Spanish government. Thus, the fear to create a precedent by recognizing Kosovo 
seemed to be decisive in the considerations of the British and Spanish governments. 
Moreover, the electoral costs in both contexts seems to provide a more substantial 
explanation. In Spain, elections were closer to the decision on the recognition of 
Kosovo than in the UK and, therefore, the issue was more salient. Furthermore, the 
consensus in favor of recognition was bigger among British parties than among Spanish 
parties. Moreover, there was more media coverage of the Kosovar issue in Spain and the 
Spanish population was more critical of the recognition of Kosovo than the British 
population. Therefore, recognition could have led to more potential electoral loss for the 
PSOE in Spain than for Labour in the UK. Overall, this table summarizes the findings: 
Hypotheses United Kingdom Spain 
H1: close ally relationship 
(decision depends on US) 
Discarded Discarded 
H2: path dependency 
(commitment to creation of 
Kosovo) 
Confirmed (presence of path 
dependency  recognition) 
Confirmed (absence of path 
dependency  non-
recognition) 
H3: secessionist challenge 
(fear for creating precedent) 
Confirmed (low fear for 
precedent  recognition) 
Confirmed (high fear for 
precedent  non-recognition) 
H4: electoral costs (potential 
electoral loss with 
recognition) 
Confirmed (absence of 
electoral costs  recognition) 
Confirmed (presence of 
electoral costs  non-
recognition) 
Table 2: Findings with regards to hypotheses   
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6. Conclusions 
This controlled comparison of two most similar cases with different outcomes on the 
recognition of a new state has generated some interesting and novel findings in this 
relatively new field of study in Political Science. First of all, H1 cannot explain the 
varying British and Spanish decisions. Therefore, the importance of recognizing-
behavior of great powers does not seem to matter as much as Coggins suggests in her 
research. Another important implication of this research is that the previously neglected 
variable of path dependency (H2) proved to be an important indicator for the behavior 
of Spain and the UK and could thus be an important factor to predict what states will 
decide eventually. However, this variable could not sufficiently explain why states 
make a certain decision with regards to the recognition of a new state.   
 The most important findings came from the domestic level of analysis. Although 
the secessionist challenge (H3) was present in both the UK and Spain, this was not 
sufficient to explain the variance in their decisions on the recognition of Kosovo. The 
difference was caused by the rhetoric of the secessionist movements and whether they 
explicitly linked their position to the Kosovar issue. Spain could not recognize Kosovo, 
because the secessionist movements in Catalonia and the Basque Country explicitly 
linked the Spanish decision on Kosovo to their own political future. Since the Scottish 
nationalists did not explicitly make this link, the UK could recognize Kosovo. Hence, 
this adds a very important sophistication and nuance to Coggins’ secessionist challenge 
variable and should be tested through additional research. Furthermore, electoral costs 
(H4) form a neglected variable that is of high importance. With upcoming elections, the 
electoral costs for the Spanish government to recognize Kosovo were high. By contrast, 
the British government did not have to fear electoral costs as a result of recognizing 
Kosovo, because there was a broad consensus in favor of the recognition of Kosovo. H4 
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plays an important role in explaining the varying decisions of the UK and Spain. 
Therefore, the central claim of this research is that countries are less likely to recognize 
a state when they fear creating a precedent for their internal secessionist movements and 
when the government faces electoral costs as a result of recognizing a country. 
 Nevertheless, there are some recommendations for further research. During the 
research, it became clear that the socialist Spanish government also possibly had to deal 
with a different kind of path dependency following their rigid interpretation of 
international law regarding the Spanish decision to join the coalition of the willing in 
the Iraq war. The conservative PP government decided in 2002/03 to join the coalition, 
a decision which was contested by the then Socialist opposition due to a lack of 
international legal legitimacy. In absence of an explicit new UNSC resolution on 
Kosovo, the government stated that UNSC Resolution 1244 could not legitimize the 
unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo. This possible additional explanation 
might be an interesting variable to look at in further research on this topic.  
 One possibility to get a more detailed explanation of what accounts for the 
varying decisions of Spain and the UK on the recognition of Kosovo is conducting 
interviews. For instance, interviews can provide new insights on party considerations of 
politicians that had to decide on the recognition of Kosovo. The major players in the 
decisions processes on the recognition of Kosovo are now possibly available and 
willing to give interviews, since they do not hold prominent positions in current politics. 
Namely, politicians like Ibarretxe, Moratinos, Brown and Miliband have resigned from 
their political positions and are not actively participating in public debates anymore.
 Moreover, in order to increase the generalizability of the findings, it is 
recommendable to apply the same hypotheses to different case studies or a quantitative 
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study. The recognition of countries has become politically burdened after the 
recognition of Kosovo and was followed by controversial recognitions of independence 
of regions such as South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This research only focused on Western 
and European democracies. The generalizability could be increased by examining a 
wider sample of the recognizing-behavior of non-democracies and countries in different 
regions or with different ethnic compositions. For instance, Italy and Switzerland might 
be interesting cases to look at whether the Albanian diaspora played substantial roles in 
the Swiss and Italian recognition of Kosovo in 2008.     
 Finally, there seems to be an interesting interaction between the secessionist 
challenge variable and the electoral costs variable that could be further examined. In 
Spain, the PP tried to blame the PSOE for being inconsistent by creating a dangerous 
precedent for Spain. This had everything to do with the fact that secessionist 
movements in Spain were framing Kosovo as a possible precedent. If these movements 
had not referred to Kosovo, the PP could not have made that argument. In further 
research, it would be interesting to examine how these two variables interact and 
whether the variable of electoral costs would also be applicable to countries without 
secessionist movements or to countries with secessionist movements, but parliamentary 
consensus. A process-tracing method could provide the necessary insights to answer 
this question. Possible cases to consider are Slovakia and Greece, since these countries 
have not recognized Kosovo, but had no elections in 2008.  
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